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Abstract
An experimental study has shown that among situations when political
scientists claimed that a political outcome was impossible, this outcome
actually occurred in 15% of the cases. In this paper, we provide a possible
explanation for this empirical fact.

1

Formulation of the Problem

Empirical fact. A detailed study [5] has shown that among situations when
political scientists claimed that a political outcome was impossible, this outcome
actually occurred in 15% of the cases.
Clariﬁcation. It should be noted that we are not talking about bizarre possibilities that everyone considers to be practically impossible – like aliens landing
on the White House. If we include such bizarre options, then, of course, the
percentage of actual occurrence would be much much smaller.
The above research only dealt with outcomes which are realistic enough, so
that at least some political scientists claim them to be possible.
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we propose a possible explanation
for the above empirical fact.

2

Analysis of the Problem

Seven plus mins two law: reminder. It is known that we usually divide
each quantity into 7 plus plus minus 2 categories – this is the largest number of
categories whose meaning we can immediately grasp; see, e.g., [2, 3]. For some
people, this “magical number” is 7 + 2 = 9, for some it is 7 − 2 = 5.
Consequences for estimating how possible are diﬀerent events. As a
result, in situations of high uncertainty, when we estimate how possible is an
1

outcome, instead of providing an exact probability p, we simply divide the range
[0, 1] of possible values of the probability into n = 7 ± 2 subintervals, and return
the value corresponding to one of these subintervals.
Since we have no reason to believe that diﬀerent subintervals have diﬀerent
width, it makes sense to conclude that these intervals are equally wide, i.e., that
they have the form
]
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The ﬁrst subinterval contains value 0 corresponding to impossibility. Thus,
if the probability p is in the ﬁrst interval, the expert will conclude that the
corresponding outcome is impossible.
Speciﬁcally:
• experts with n = 9 consider all the outcomes with probability
p<

1
≈ 0.111
9

to be impossible;
• experts with n = 8 consider all the outcomes with probability
p<

1
= 0.125
8

to be impossible;
• experts with n = 7 consider all the outcomes with probability
p<

1
≈ 0.143
7

to be impossible;
• experts with n = 6 consider all the outcomes with probability
p<

1
≈ 0.167
6

to be impossible;
• experts with n = 5 consider all the outcomes with probability
p<

1
= 0.2
5

to be impossible.
We are interested in outcomes with probability p for which at least one expert
considers them possible, but the current expert considers them impossible. The
condition that at least one expert considers the outcome possible means that
p<

1
≈ 0.111.
9

Thus:
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• for experts with n = 9, such mislabeled outcomes are impossible;
• for experts with n = 8, we are interested in the outcomes for which
1
1
< p < = 0.125;
9
8
• for experts with n = 7, we are interested in the outcomes for which
1
1
< p < ≈ 0.143;
9
7
• for experts with n = 6, we are interested in the outcomes for which
1
1
< p < ≈ 0.167;
9
6
• for experts with n = 5, we are interested in the outcomes for which
1
1
< p < = 0.2.
9
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Let us show that this idea explains the above empirical fact.
Frequency of diﬀerent probabilities p and diﬀerent values n. Similarly
to the above argument, we do not have any reason to believe that diﬀerent
probabilities p are more or less probable. Thus, it is reasonable assume that all
the values p ∈ [0, 1] are equally probable, i.e., that the probability p is uniformly
distributed on the interval [0, 1]; see, e.g., [1].
Resulting estimates. Under the uniformity assumptions, we get the following
estimates:
• For an expert with n = 8, the (conditional) probability p8 of encountering
a possible outcome that this expert will (
claim )
to be impossible is equal to
1 1
the width of the corresponding interval
,
, i.e., to the diﬀerence
9 8
p8 =

1 1
− .
8 9

The average value a8 of such probability p is equal to the midpoint of this
interval. i.e., to
1 1
+
9
8.
a8 =
2
• For an expert with n = 7, the (conditional) probability p7 of encountering
a possible outcome that this expert will (
claim )
to be impossible is equal to
1 1
,
, i.e., to the diﬀerence
the width of the corresponding interval
9 7
p7 =
3

1 1
− .
7 9

The average value a7 of such probability p is equal to the midpoint of this
interval. i.e., to
1 1
+
9
7.
a7 =
2
• For an expert with n = 6, the (conditional) probability p6 of encountering
a possible outcome that this expert will (
claim )
to be impossible is equal to
1 1
the width of the corresponding interval
,
, i.e., to the diﬀerence
9 6
p6 =

1 1
− .
6 9

The average value a6 of such probability p is equal to the midpoint of this
interval. i.e., to
1 1
+
a6 = 9 6 .
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• For an expert with n = 5, the (conditional) probability p5 of encountering
a possible outcome that this expert will (
claim )
to be impossible is equal to
1 1
the width of the corresponding interval
,
, i.e., to the diﬀerence
9 5
p5 =

1 1
− .
5 9

The average value a5 of such probability p is equal to the midpoint of this
interval. i.e., to
1 1
+
a5 = 9 5 .
2
Frequency of diﬀerent values n. Similarly, since we have no reason to believe
that experts with some values of n are more probable, it is reasonable to assume
that all the ﬁve n = 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 values are equally probable, i.e., that each of
1
these values occurs with the same probability .
5
Resulting probability. Since experts with diﬀerent values n are equally frequent, the average probability p of a possible outcome erroneously labeled as
impossible can be obtained by averaging the conditional averages an corresponding to diﬀerent values n – with the weights proportional to the n-conditional
probabilities pn of such erroneous labeling. Thus, we arrive at the following
formula:

4

3

Resulting Explanation

According to the above analysis, the average probability p of a possible outcome
which is erroneously labeled as impossible is equal to:
p=

p8 · a8 + p7 · a7 + p6 · a6 + p5 · a5
.
p8 + p7 + p6 + p5

Substituting the above values of pi and ai into this formula, we conclude that
p ≈ 0.14 – which is very close to the empirical value 15%.
Thus, we have indeed justiﬁed the empirical observation.
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